Europe’s liberal order faces a reverse 1968, Lukyanov argues

Europe’s governing institutions risk weakening themselves by excluding conservative challengers rather than responding to their supporters, Russian foreign-policy commentator Fyodor Lukyanov argues in a commentary published on October 20. He presents contemporary unrest as a possible reversal of 1968: a challenge to the liberal political culture that those earlier upheavals helped advance.

The article appeared in RT, which identifies it as a translated and edited version of a piece first published by Kommersant. Lukyanov is editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club. His account is an argument about political change, rather than a documented survey of protest movements or voter attitudes.

The historical comparison

Lukyanov draws a parallel between present-day discontent and the unrest that spread across countries with sharply different political systems in 1968. He identifies inequality, education disputes, frustration with political elites and wars lacking clear objectives as recurring grievances, while acknowledging that the comparison is imperfect.

In his reading, the movements of 1968 challenged conservative establishments and eventually helped reshape public life, even where their immediate demands went unmet. Today, he argues, opposition is increasingly directed against the political framework that emerged from that transformation.

His central distinction concerns how institutions handle dissent. He credits Western European governments with eventually bringing much of the earlier protest movement into mainstream politics after initially suppressing it. By contrast, he argues that socialist systems relied on repression and allowed unresolved tensions to accumulate. This is a broad historical interpretation, not a country-by-country explanation of the different systems’ subsequent trajectories.

An argument for accommodating conservative challengers

Lukyanov contends that the groups now requiring political inclusion are opponents of the legacy of 1968, including movements commonly described as far-right populist. He alleges that Western European establishments regard conservative competitors as more threatening than destructive actors on the opposing side of politics.

The commentary does not identify specific parties, government decisions or comparative evidence establishing that alleged double standard. It also describes political manipulation and repression in general terms, without documenting individual cases.

On foreign policy, Lukyanov argues that European leaders’ emphasis on confrontation with Russia conflicts with citizens’ concerns about prosperity and living standards. That claim is central to his diagnosis of a widening divide between governments and voters, but the article cites no polling, spending comparisons or election data to establish the relative weight of those priorities.

He also acknowledges that contemporary unrest has not produced a coherent revolutionary alternative. His warning is therefore about the potential consequences of institutional resistance to change, rather than evidence that a replacement political order is already taking shape.

The limits of the India reference

The article briefly includes India among countries experiencing continuing protests, alongside references to unrest in France, Italy, Albania and Argentina. It does not identify the Indian demonstrations, their organisers, demands, dates or scale, or provide a government response.

That passing reference cannot establish a single political pattern linking Indian protests to Europe’s ideological disputes. Nor does it substantiate any claim of unlawful interference or a threat to India’s democratic order. Lukyanov’s wider thesis remains an attributed interpretation of political tensions, not proof that distinct national movements share a cause or direction.