Russia presses Iran–Gulf diplomacy as conflict threatens ties

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks in Bahrain on October 18 and in Iran the following day, putting Gulf de-escalation, maritime security and economic cooperation on the agenda. According to an October 22 analysis published by RT, he attended the ninth ministerial meeting of the Russia–Gulf Cooperation Council strategic dialogue in Manama before meeting Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and President Masoud Pezeshkian in Tehran.

The account, written by Murad Sadygzade, president of the Middle East Studies Center and a visiting lecturer at HSE University in Moscow, presents the diplomatic effort as an attempt to protect Russia’s relationships on both sides of the Gulf. Its central argument is that a temporary increase in oil revenues would not offset the wider damage caused by prolonged conflict. That is the author’s assessment of Russian interests, rather than an independently established calculation of the war’s costs.

Gulf concerns and Tehran’s position

In Manama, Lavrov held separate meetings with the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The account says he and his Kuwaiti counterpart called for a rapid reduction in tensions and identified a political and diplomatic settlement as the way forward.

Arab representatives also asked Moscow to use its relationship with Tehran to communicate their concerns. Sadygzade describes Gulf grievances over strikes on their territory and threats to maritime routes, but does not provide incident-level evidence or detailed Iranian responses to those grievances.

In Tehran, Lavrov supported restoring security and shipping conditions to their position before the US–Israeli military operation described in the article. Iran, which the account says regards that operation as the origin of the crisis, reiterated its preference for diplomacy. These statements did not establish agreement on specific reciprocal commitments.

The Manama discussions also addressed Yemen, preservation of the Gaza ceasefire, humanitarian access and the reliability of energy and food supplies.

A security framework, not a completed agreement

Lavrov again promoted Russia’s updated proposal for collective security in the Persian Gulf. According to the account, he had said in June that revised proposals were being circulated to regional capitals and were drawing initial responses.

The approach seeks to include both Iran and the Arab monarchies in a shared security arrangement, with regular contact and confidence-building measures intended to reduce mistrust. It gives regional countries the leading role while allowing outside support, including from members of the UN Security Council.

Sadygzade links this effort to an earlier Russian concept circulated at the United Nations in 2019, which emphasised sovereignty, peaceful dispute resolution and gradual development of collective security mechanisms. He does not establish that the revised proposal retains every provision of that earlier document.

The author identifies incident-prevention procedures, protection of civilian infrastructure and secure maritime routes as possible practical starting points. These are suggested areas for agreement, not measures shown to have been accepted during Lavrov’s visit.

Why an oil windfall may not compensate

Sadygzade challenges the view that disruption to Gulf energy supplies necessarily delivers a strategic gain for Russia. Higher prices could help exporters initially, he argues, while prolonged insecurity could damage investment, transport links and commercial relationships.

The account points to Russia’s work in Iran as a concrete exposure. In Tehran, Lavrov reportedly discussed the gradual return of Russian specialists to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, alongside prospects for cooperation in hydrocarbon production and transportation. It provides no staffing totals, project valuations or quantified estimate of conflict-related losses.

The author also argues that higher shipping and insurance costs can undermine long-term projects, while a sustained energy shock can weaken the global economy and eventually reduce demand. His conclusion is therefore about competing risks over time, not a demonstrated balance-sheet finding that Russia has already lost more than it has gained.

Moscow’s access has limits

Russia’s relationships with both Iran and Gulf Arab states give it channels through which to relay concerns and explore compromises. But Sadygzade acknowledges that access does not confer authority over its partners, and that Moscow’s closeness to Tehran may itself prompt reservations among Arab participants.

The diplomatic opportunity consequently depends on decisions by Iran and the Gulf states: whether they will negotiate concrete obligations, address one another’s security concerns and limit the use of force. The account describes an effort to create those conditions, not a concluded peace arrangement.